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ADvERsE PossEssIoN
 ABANDoNED RAILRoAD TRACKs. The disputed 
property had been a railroad right-of-way neighboring the 
plaintiffs’ farm. When the railroad removed the track and ties 
in 1976, the plaintiffs fenced the disputed land and used the 
land for growing crops, pasturing cattle and flood control.  At 
that time the railroad still held title of record for the disputed 
land.  The defendant pipeline company purchased the land 
from the railroad in 2001 for construction of a pipeline. The 
plaintiffs notified the defendant that they claimed ownership of 
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the disputed land but the defendant ignored the notice, based on 
the defendant’s recorded title. The trial jury awarded title to the 
land to the plaintiffs and awarded actual and exemplary damages 
to the plaintiffs. The appellate court upheld the jury verdict of 
title by adverse possession in the plaintiffs because the verdict 
was supported by substantial evidence of open, continuous and 
adverse use by the plaintiffs, particularly because the property was 
fenced by the plaintiffs. The appellate court reversed on the issue 
of damages, holding that insufficient evidence of the value of the 
loss of use was presented, insufficient evidence was presented as 
to loss of value of neighboring land, and insufficient evidence of 
malice was presented to support the exemplary damages.  Kinder 
Morgan North Texas Pipeline, L.P. v. Justiss, 2006 Tex. App. 
partner’s election relates only to property distributed out of the 
partnership.35 If the partner’s election is utilized, it is generally 
advisable to liquidate quickly and avoid additional partnership 
income after the death of the partner.
self-employment tax in the year of death
 For social security purposes, the distributive share of a partner 
for the year of death up to the end of the month in which the 
partner died is reported as self-employment income for the year 
of death.36 For purposes of determining the partner’s distributive 
share up to the date of death, the ordinary income or loss of 
the partnership is treated as having been realized or sustained 
ratably over the partnership’s taxable year.37 There is no election 
involved.  
In conclusion
 Planning for retirement or death of a partner is demanding but 
the payoff can be substantial. Typically, the greater problem is to 
energize the partners into examining the options  available
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 BANKRuPTCy
GENERAL
 EXEMPTIoNs
 HOMESTEAD. When the debtors filed for bankruptcy, the 
debtors claimed their farm as an exempt homestead under the 
federal exemptions.  The trustee objected to the exemption and the 
exemption was denied because the debtors failed to respond to the 
trustee’s objection. The debtors later amended their schedule of 
assets to claim the farm as an exempt homestead under Minnesota 
law. The debtors also claimed the state exemptions for other 
bankruptcy property. The trustee objected to the amendment on 
the basis that the exempt status of the farm was determined by the 
res judicata effect by the prior trustee motion and court denial of 
the federal exemption. The court noted that the federal homestead 
exemption was limited by the value of the property eligible for 
the exemption; whereas the Minnesota homestead exemption was 
based on the number of acres eligible for the exemption. The court 
held that the determination of eligibility for the federal homestead 
exemption was not the same action as a determination of eligibility 
for a state homestead exemption.  Therefore, the prior denial of 
the federal exemption was not entitled to res judicata effect over 
the eligibility for the state homestead exemption. The court noted 
that the debtors could not have asserted the state exemption until 
the initial federal exemption was removed or denied; therefore, 
the debtors had no opportunity to raise the state exemption issue 
until the federal exemption was denied by the court.  In re Ladd, 
450 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2006), rev’g, 319 B.R. 599 (Bankr. 8th 
Cir. 2005).
CHAPTER 12
 CREDIT CouNsELING REQuIREMENT. Under the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No 109-8, individuals are required to seek and 
attend credit counseling within 180 days before filing a bankruptcy 
petition. The debtor filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy as a family 
farmer and initially sought a waiver from the credit counseling 
requirement because there were no credit counselors for family 
farmers. The Bankruptcy Court denied the waiver after the debtor 
presented statements from credit counseling agencies that they 
provided credit counseling for family farmers. The debtor then 
argued that the credit counseling requirement did not apply to 
family farmers because Section 109(h) did not mention family 
farmers and Section 109(f) did not define a family farmer as an 
individual. The court noted that Section 109(g) includes family 
farmers, indicating that Congress intended all of the Section 109 
provisions to apply to family farmers filing as individual debtors. 
The court held that the debtor must comply with the credit 
counseling requirement before filing for Chapter 12.  Bogedain 
v. Eisen, 2006 u.s. Dist. LEXIs 59926 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
FEDERAL TAXATIoN
 PosT-PETITIoN INCoME. Under Section 1115, enacted by 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No 109-8, the bankruptcy estate, not the debtor, 
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must include in gross income the debtor’s gross earnings from 
postpetition services, as well as gross income from postpetition 
property under I.R.C. § 1398(e). For bankruptcy cases filed 
before October 17, 2005, these amounts are generally includible 
in the debtor’s gross income. The IRS has issued guidance 
for individuals complying with Section 1115. The new rule is 
subject to four exceptions: (1) if a Chapter 11 case is converted 
to a Chapter 13 case, the Chapter 13 estate is not a separate 
taxable entity and earnings from post-conversion services and 
income from property of the estate realized after the conversion 
to Chapter 13 are taxed to the debtor, see I.R.C. §1399. (2) If the 
Chapter 11 case is converted to a Chapter 7 case, Section 1115 
will not apply after conversion and earnings from post-conversion 
services will be taxed to the debtor, rather than the estate, see 11 
U.S.C. §541(a)(6). In such a case, the property of the Chapter 11 
estate will become property of the Chapter 7 estate. Any income 
on this property will be taxed to the estate even if the income is 
realized after the conversion to Chapter 7. (3) If a Chapter 11 
case is dismissed, the debtor is treated as if the bankruptcy case 
had never been filed and as if no bankruptcy estate had been 
created. See I.R.C. §1398(b)(1). (4) For Chapter 11 cases filed 
by individuals on or after October 17, 2005, the estate’s gross 
income includes gross income from property held by the debtor 
when the case commenced (“pre-petition property”), as was the 
case under pre-BAPCPA law. There are certain exceptions to this 
general rule, however. The gross income on pre-petition property 
is included in the gross income of the debtor, rather than the estate, 
if the pre-petition property is excluded from the estate and the 
gross income is subject to taxation. Also, the gross income on 
pre-petition property is included in the gross income of the debtor, 
rather than the estate, after the pre-petition property is removed 
from the estate by exemption or abandonment.  The bankruptcy 
estate is required to obtain an employer identification number. If 
the debtor earns self-employment income, the debtor  is required 
to report the self-employment income on Schedule SE and pay 
the resulting tax. The new rules do not effect the requirements of 
the debtor’s employer to withhold, report and pay employment 
taxes on the debtor’s wages.  Notice 2006-83, I.R.B. 2006-40.
FEDERAL AGRICuLTuRAL 
PRoGRAMs
 BRuCELLosIs. The APHIS has issued interim regulations 
amending the brucellosis regulations concerning the interstate 
movement of cattle by changing the classification of Wyoming 
from Class A to Class Free. 71 Fed. Reg. 54402 (sept. 15, 
2006).
 oRGANIC FooD. The AMS has adopted as final regulations 
amending the USDA National List of Allowed and Prohibited 
Substances regulations to reflect recommendations submitted to 
the Secretary of Agriculture by the National Organic Standards 
Board from November 15, 2000, through March 3, 2005 for 
the addition of 13 substances. 71 Fed. Reg. 53299 (sept. 11, 
2006). 
 FEDERAL EsTATE
AND GIFT  TAXATIoN
 TRusTs. The taxpayer established a trust which had the 
taxpayer and members of the taxpayer’s family as beneficiaries. 
The trust income and principal could be distributed by a 
distribution committee consisting of two adult beneficiaries. 
The taxpayer retained a testamentary limited power of 
appointment and the trust provided for distribution of trust 
assets upon the death of the taxpayer if the taxpayer did 
not exercise the power of appointment.  The IRS ruled that 
contributions to the trust were not completed gifts. The IRS 
also ruled that, because members of the distribution committee 
could not make distributions to themselves with the consent 
of the other committee member, the committee members did 
not have a general power of appointment over trust property 
and the committee members would not be considered to make 
gifts if distributions were made to the taxpayer.  Ltr. Rul. 
200637025, June 5, 2006.
 The taxpayer’s deceased parent had created an irrevocable 
trust prior to September 25, 1985, for the benefit of the 
taxpayer, with remainders to the taxpayer’s children in equal 
shares. The taxpayer petitioned a state court to divide the trust 
into four trusts, with each trust having a different child of the 
taxpayer as the remainder beneficiary. Each trust would receive 
an equal share of the original trust property and the terms of 
each trust would otherwise remain the same as the original trust, 
except for the split of remainder interests.  The IRS ruled that 
the division of the trust would not subject the trust to GST tax, 
no taxable gift occurred, no taxable gain or loss was recognized 
and the divided assets retained the tax basis and holding period 
as in the original trust.  Ltr. Rul. 200637042, June 5, 2006.
 FEDERAL INCoME
TAXATIoN
 BAD DEBT DEDuCTIoN. A beverage company created 
an unrelated corporation to purchase a bottling facility which 
the beverage company had been leasing for its business. The 
unrelated corporation borrowed from the beverage company 
the purchase price which was equal to the value of the rental 
payments originally made by the beverage company. The 
purchase was intended to allow the beverage company to 
renegotiate a less expensive lease for the facility and then 
permit a resale of the facility to repay the loan. The repurchase 
deal fell through and no other buyers were available. The 
unrelated company could not make the principal payments on 
the loan. The beverage corporation was merged with another 
corporation. The merged corporation, the taxpayer in this case, 
seized the bottling facility which secured the loan and declared 
the loan in default.  The taxpayer claimed a bad debt deduction 
for a portion of the loan based on the unrelated corporation’s 
inability to make any principal payments, sell the facility or generate 
enough income to repay the loan. The court held that the a sufficient 
number of identifiable events had occurred which demonstrated 
that a portion of the loan would not be repaid; therefore, a bad debt 
deduction was allowed for the difference between the amount owed 
and the value of the collateral received.  ABC Beverage Corp. v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-195.
 CHARITABLE DEDuCTIoNs. The taxpayers claimed 
charitable deductions for cash contributions to a church. The 
taxpayers did not obtain or maintain receipts of the contributions 
but produced post-audit only a list of the weekly contributions to the 
church. The taxpayer provided no corroborative evidence to support 
the list. The court held that the IRS properly denied the charitable 
deductions because the taxpayers failed to substantiate the amount 
or nature of the contributions. In all these cases, the taxpayers used 
the same tax return preparer.  Lewis v. Comm’r, T.C. summary 
op. 2006-140; Harrell v. Comm’r, T.C. summary op. 2006-141; 
Warren v. Comm’r, T.C. summary op. 2006-142; Muhammad 
v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2006-144; Warfield v. Comm’r, 
T.C. summary op. 2006-145.
 The taxpayers, husband and wife, owned two farms. Based on two 
sets of appraisals, the taxpayers sold the development rights to the 
farms to a land preservation foundation for less than the fair market 
value of the development rights. The taxpayer claimed a noncash 
charitable gift deduction for the difference in the amount received 
from the fair market value of the development rights. The taxpayers 
filed Form 8283, Noncash Charitable Contributions; however, the 
form was not signed by the donee or the appraisers, did not include 
an appraisal made for tax purposes, did not specifically identify the 
property, the date and circumstances of the contribution, and did 
not identify that the contribution resulted from a bargain sale.  The 
IRS requested the missing information and the taxpayer re-filed 
the form but only added the missing signature from the donee. The 
court held that the taxpayer failed substantially to comply with the 
reporting requirements of Form 8283 and were properly denied 
the charitable deduction.  Ney v. Comm’r, T.C. summary op. 
2006-154.
 CoRPoRATIoNs
 REORGANIZATIONS. Under I.R.C. § 355, a corporation’s 
distribution to its shareholders of stock and securities of a controlled 
corporation is not a recognition event if both corporations are 
engaged in an active trade or business after the distribution. Prior 
to the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 
(TIPRA) (Pub. L. No. 109-222), a corporation was treated as 
engaged in an active trade or business if it actually was so engaged, 
or if substantially all of its assets were the stock and securities of a 
controlled corporation which was so engaged (the holding company 
test). TIPRA eliminated the holding company test for distributions 
made after May 17, 2006, and on or before December 31, 2010. 
In its place, a corporation will be considered to be engaged in 
the active conduct of a trade or business only if it is so engaged. 
However, the corporation’s entire separate affiliated group will be 
considered as one corporation to determine whether there is an 
active trade or business. Under the grandfather rule, under I.R.C. § 
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355(b)(3)(C), as added by TIPRA, corporations must apply the 
old-law holding company test for distributions made after May 
17, 2006, if they are made pursuant to a transaction that was: (1) 
made pursuant to an agreement that was binding on that date and 
at all times thereafter; (2) described in a ruling request submitted 
on or before that date; or (3) described on or before that date in a 
public announcement or filing with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  However, the distributing corporation may elect 
out of the grandfather rule. The IRS has issued guidance for 
distributing corporations making an election not to be governed 
by the grandfather or transition rule.  Notice 2006-81, I.R.B. 
2006-39.
 DEPENDENTs. The IRS has issued guidance under the 
I.R.C. §  152(c)(4) “tie-breaking rule” used to determine which 
taxpayer may claim a qualifying child when the child is used by 
multiple taxpayers to claim (1) head of household filing status 
(I.R.C. §  2(b)), (2) the child and dependent care credit (I.R.C. § 
21), (3) the child tax credit (I.R.C. §  24), (4) the earned income 
credit (I.R.C. §  32), (5) the exclusion from income for dependent 
care assistance (I.R.C. §  129), or (6) the dependency deduction 
(I.R.C. §  151). The guidance provides that, unless I.R.C. § 
152(e) applies, the tie-breaking rule of I.R.C. § 152(c)(4) shall 
apply to these provisions as a group, rather than section-by-
section. The child is, therefore, treated as the child of only one 
taxpayer for all the provisions that employ the I.R.C. § 152(c) 
uniform definition of a qualifying child.  An exception exists for 
those taxpayers to whom I.R.C. § 152(e) applies. Under I.R.C. § 
152(e), a noncustodial parent may claim a child as a qualifying 
child for purposes of the child tax credit and the dependency 
deduction only. The custodial parent may then claim the child as 
a qualifying child for purposes of head of household filing status, 
the earned income credit, the child and dependent care credit, or 
the exclusion from income for dependent care assistance. In such 
case, the child would be the qualifying child of two taxpayers. 
Notice 2006-86, I.R.B. 2006-41.
DIsAsTER LossEs. On August 30, 2006, the president 
determined that certain areas in New Mexico are eligible for 
assistance from the government under the Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5121) as a result of 
severe storms and flooding, which began on July 26, 2006. 
FEMA-1659-DR.   On September 7, 2006, the president 
determined that certain areas in Arizona are eligible for assistance 
from the government under the Act as a result of severe storms 
and flooding, which began on July 25, 2006. FEMA-1660-DR. 
Taxpayers who sustained losses attributable to these disasters 
may deduct the losses on their 2005 returns
 DIsCHARGE oF INDEBTEDNEss. The taxpayer was 
a corporation which was reorganized into a new corporation. 
As a result of the reorganization, the taxpayer had discharge 
of indebtedness income but failed to make the election under 
I.R.C. § 108(b)(5) to reduce the basis of depreciable property 
before reducing other tax items to the extent of the discharge 
of indebtedness income. The taxpayer had hired a professional 
tax advisor to advise on the election but the election was 
inadvertently missed in filing the taxpayer’s returns.  The IRS 
granted an extension of time to file an amended return with the 
Section 108(b)(5) election.  Ltr. Rul. 200637023, June 12, 
2006.
 The taxpayers, husband and wife, defaulted on their home 
first and second mortgages and sold their home to pay off the 
mortgages. The sale did not produce enough funds to pay off 
both mortgages and the mortgagor forgave the remaining balance 
of the second mortgage. The taxpayer provided some evidence 
of their assets and liabilities on the date of the debt forgiveness, 
showing more than $62,000 in liabilities in excess of assets. 
However, the husband also owned an interest in a pension fund 
but could not prove the value of the assets in the fund at the time 
of the debt forgiveness.  Because the taxpayer could not prove 
that the pension fund was less than $62,000, the court could not 
rule that the taxpayers were insolvent or how much the taxpayers 
were insolvent at the time of the debt forgiveness; therefore, 
the court held that the entire amount of debt forgiveness was 
taxable discharge of indebtedness income.  Gale v. Comm’r, 
T.C. summary op. 2006-152.
 HyBRID vEHICLE TAX CREDIT. Effective for vehicles 
placed in service after December 31, 2005, an alternative motor 
vehicle credit is allowed which is the sum of (1) qualified fuel cell 
motor vehicle credit, (2) advanced lean burn technology motor 
vehicle credit, (3) qualified hybrid motor vehicle credit, and (4) 
qualified alternative fuel motor vehicle credit. I.R.C. § 30B(a). 
The credits allowed cannot exceed the regular tax reduced by 
other credits over the tentative minimum tax for the year. I.R.C. 
§ 30B(g)(2). The credits are treated as a general business credit 
if the vehicle is subject to an allowance for depreciation. I.R.C. § 
30B(g)(1). The IRS has announced that Toyota Motor Sales has 
reported that it has reached the 60,000-vehicle limit during the 
calendar quarter ending on June 30, 2006. The IRS has issued 
guidance on the phaseout of the credit for qualified Toyota 
vehicles. For vehicles purchased for use or lease on or after 
October 1, 2006, and on or before March 31, 2007, the credit is 
50 percent of the otherwise allowable amount determined under § 
30B(c) or (d). For vehicles purchased for use or lease on or after 
April 1, 2007, and on or before September 30, 2007, the credit is 
25 percent of the otherwise allowable amount determined under 
§ 30B(c) or (d). For vehicles purchased for use or lease on or 
after October 1, 2007, no credit is allowable. Notice 2006-78, 
I.R.B. 2006-41.
 INTEREsT RATE.  The IRS has announced that, for the 
period October 1, 2006 through December 31, 2006, the interest 
rate paid on tax overpayments remains at 8 percent (7 percent 
in the case of a corporation) and for underpayments remains 
at 8 percent. The interest rate for underpayments by large 
corporations remains at 10 percent. The overpayment rate for the 
portion of a corporate overpayment exceeding $10,000 remains 
at 5.5 percent. Rev. Rul. 2006-49, I.R.B. 2006-39. 
 PARTNERsHIPs
 BASIS ELECTION.  The taxpayer was a limited liability 
company taxed as a partnership. One of the LLC members died 
and the deceased member’s share of the LLC was transferred to 
a trust. In filing the partnership return for the year of the death 
of the member, the LLC inadvertently failed to make the I.R.C. 
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§ 754 election to adjust the basis of LLC property. The IRS 
granted a 60-day extension of time to file an amended return 
with the election.  Ltr. Rul. 200637008, June 6, 2006.
 LOSS OF PARTNERSHIP INTEREST. The taxpayer joined 
a limited liability partnership and provided a contribution to 
the LLP in the form of a subordinated loan. The taxpayer later 
resigned from the LLP and sought return of the loan amount 
under provisions of the LLP agreement. The LLP did not dispute 
its obligation to repay the contribution but did not make the 
repayment before ceasing business.  The LLP has not filed for 
bankruptcy and there is evidence that the LLP still has assets 
with which to pay creditors, including the taxpayer. In a Chief 
Counsel advice letter, the IRS ruled that the taxpayer could not 
yet claim a loss deduction under I.R.C. § 165 for an abandoned 
or worthless partnership interest because the evidence indicated 
that the taxpayer had not abandoned the partnership nor had 
the partnership interest become worthless.  CCA Ltr. Rul. 
200637032, sept. 2, 2005.
 PAssIvE ACTIvITy LossEs. The taxpayers were 
brothers who had formed an equal partnership which owned 
several residential rental properties. The taxpayers also 
individually owned rental properties. The partnership and 
individual properties produced tax losses which were claimed 
as deductions by the taxpayers. The taxpayer argued that they 
were entitled to deduct the losses under the I.R.C. § 469(c)(7)(B) 
exception to deductions for passive activity losses. The court 
noted that the taxpayer met several requirements for the 
exception: the partnership constituted a real property trade or 
business, the taxpayers materially participated in the business 
and the taxpayers provided personal services for the business. 
The issue was whether the taxpayers worked more than half of 
their time on the business. The court noted that both taxpayer 
were employed full-time at one or more other professional 
jobs. The taxpayers provided reconstructed worksheets of 
the hours worked on the rental real estate property business 
but no corroborating evidence to support the time sheets. The 
time sheets indicated that the taxpayers each put in more than 
2000 hours each year on the rental business. Unfortunately, the 
taxpayers had also produced work sheets during the IRS audit 
which were not consistent with the work sheets produced for 
trial. The court also noted that several activities listed appeared 
to be exaggerated as to the amount of time needed to compleat 
simple tasks. In addition, the court disbelieved the taxpayers’ 
statements as to the amount of time spent on their other 
professional work.  The court held that the loss deductions were 
properly denied because the taxpayers failed to prove that they 
had spent more than half of their time on the rental business. 
Lee v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-193.
 TRusTs. The taxpayers were married to each other. 
The husband, as grantor, and the wife, as trustee created an 
irrevocable trust for the benefit of the issue of their marriage. 
The trustee had the absolute discretion to distribute the income 
and principal of trust to and among the grantor’s issue. The 
taxpayers represented that the trust was a grantor trust for 
federal income tax purposes. The husband owned a variable 
universal life insurance policy and had paid all policy premiums. 
The husband transferred the policy to the trust for valuable 
consideration but  requested a ruling that the purchase of the 
policy from the husband by the trust would not constitute a 
transfer for a valuable consideration within the meaning of 
I.R.C. § 101(a)(2). Under I.R.C. § 101(a)(2), the exclusion 
from income of death proceeds of a life insurance contract is 
limited to the amount of valuable consideration received and 
any premiums paid, if the contract is sold or exchanged  for 
valuable consideration. The IRS ruled that, because the trust 
was a grantor trust, all trust assets were treated as belonging 
to the grantor; therefore, the husband as grantor could not 
give valuable consideration to himself through a “sale” of the 
insurance policy to the grantor trust.  Ltr. Rul. 200636086, May 
30, 2006.
sAFE HARBoR INTEREsT RATEs
 october 2006
 Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
short-term
AFR  5.00 4.94 4.91 4.89
110 percent AFR 5.50 5.43 5.39 5.37
120 percent AFR 6.02 5.93 5.89 5.86
Mid-term
AFR  4.82 4.76 4.73 4.71
110 percent AFR  5.31 5.24 5.21 5.18
120 percent AFR 5.79 5.71 5.67 5.64
Long-term
AFR 5.02 4.96 4.93 4.91
110 percent AFR  5.53 5.46 5.42 5.40
120 percent AFR  6.04 5.95 5.91 5.88
Rev. Rul. 2006-50, I.R.B. 2006-41.
 
PRoPERTy
 IRRIGATIoN EAsEMENT. The parties owned neighboring 
land and the defendant had a water right to water which flowed 
through a ditch which ran across the plaintiff’s property.  The 
water right was temporarily terminated when the defendant 
failed to pay a claim processing fee but was reinstated after the 
fee was paid.  The plaintiff filed a declaratory relief action to 
remove the easement for the ditch, arguing that the termination 
of the water right terminated the easement. During that action, 
the plaintiff filled in the ditch without leave of the court and 
the defendant filed for an injunction against the plaintiff. The 
court awarded the injunction and ordered the plaintiff to restore 
the ditch. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that no injunction 
could be granted where no action remained to be enjoined.  The 
appellate court agreed, holding that the restoration of the ditch 
was proper in the prior declaratory judgment action and could 
not be ordered through an injunction.  Mustang Holdings, LLC 
v. Zaveta, 2006 Mont. LEXIs 443 (Mont. 2006).
 PREsCRIPTIvE EAsEMENT.  The plaintiff owned 
farmland which included a one acre cemetery owned by the 
defendant cemetery association since 1881.  The cemetery 
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and its water rights. The parties negotiated a settlement of the 
estate which transferred one farm wholly to the plaintiff and the 
other farm wholly to the defendant. During this time, the tenant 
on the properties applied for a permanent status for the water 
rights to avoid annual applications required because the irrigation 
equipment was moved. The plaintiff argued that the application 
process transferred the water rights to both properties to the 
plaintiff’s farm.  The court held that the application for a change 
in water rights status did not affect the ownership status of those 
water rights and the defendant retained ownership to the water 
rights on the farm received from the estate.  Kissler v. Buckland, 
2006 Wash. App. LEXIs 2069 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). 
CITATIoN uPDATEs
 Tetzlaff v. Camp, 715 N.W.2d 256 (Iowa 2006) (nuisance) 
see p. 95 supra. 
IN THE NEWs
 GENETICALLy MoDIFIED oRGANIsMs.  India’s 
Supreme Court has ruled that the Indian Genetic Engineering 
Approval Committee (GEAC) must freeze approvals on GMO 
products until further notice.  The decision by the three judge 
panel came in a case in which it was alleged that GEAC was 
giving approval to GMO products before adequately testing the 
bio-safety of the products. In its brief order, the bench said “we 
are not inclined to direct stoppage of all field trials at this stage 
without the stand of the respondents.  At the same time we deem it 
appropriate to direct GEAC to withhold the approvals till further 
directions are issued on hearing all concerned.  The government 
would also consider associating independent experts in the field 
in the GEAC.”  The litigation alleged that if “GEAC’s reckless 
rush into GM foods was not checked” there would be “irreversible 
impacts” on Indian farmers, food and health. DailyIndia.com 
http://www.dailyindia.com/show/62507.php
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contained 17 marked graves and indications of at least 20 more, 
with the last known burial in 1896. The plaintiff installed a center 
pivot irrigation system and the outside wheel passed over a portion 
of the cemetery, although not over any known grave. The irrigation 
pipes and sprinklers extending beyond the last wheel also passed 
over the cemetery. The plaintiff sought a quiet title action to create 
a prescriptive easement over the cemetery for the use of the center 
pivot irrigation system.  The court held that cemeteries have a public 
nature and, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1404, are not subject 
to transfer of title by prescriptive easement. sjuts v. Granville 
Cemetery Association, __ N.W.2d ___, 272 Neb. 103 (2006).
 RIPARIAN RIGHTs. The plaintiff owned land on one side 
of the Platte River and the defendant owned the land on the other 
side. Between their properties in the middle of the river was an 
island which had been created and increased over the years and the 
parties disputed who owned the island. The ownership of the island 
depended upon where the thread (center of the deepest channel) 
of the river was located, whether it was on the defendant’s side 
of the island or the plaintiff’s.  Both parties presented evidence 
of the effects of the drought on the two forks which conflicted as 
to whether the north or south fork was the strongest and deepest 
channel. The historical evidence tended to show that the north fork 
went dry first but the defendant presented some evidence that the 
water in the south fork came from underground sources and not 
from the natural flow of the river.  The appellate court held that there 
was sufficient evidence for the trial court’s decision to determine 
that the plaintiff owned the island because the river thread was 
on the defendant’s south side of the river. Because each riparian 
owner’s property rights continued to the river thread, the plaintiff’s 
property included the island. schlondorf v. Breunig, 2006 Neb. 
App. LEXIs 144 (Neb. Ct. App. 2006).
WATER RIGHTs
 TEsTAMENTARy TRANsFER. The parties’ predecessors 
in interest inherited a farm with water rights and purchased an 
additional farm, also with its water rights. On the death of the 
predecessors in interest, the defendant received ownership of one 
farm and its water rights and partial ownership of the other farm 
